Nuclear Arm Race-Compliance Report and Nuclear treaties

Part of: GS-II- International treaties (PT-MAINS-PERSONALITY TEST)

In News: 2020 Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Compliance ReportThe Trump Administration just released its “Executive Summary of Findings on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” also known as the Compliance Report. As directed by Congress, the Department of State is required to provide an annual report on “the status of United States policy and actions with respect to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.” An unclassified report (with classified annexes, as necessary) must be submitted to Congress by April 15 each year. The full report has reportedly been delayed due to the COVID-19 crisis.

The 2020 Executive Summary of the Compliance Report includes a number of assessments and significant concerns and charges that were not present in the 2019 Compliance Report. In addition to new language describing the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, there is language expressing stronger concern over whether China, Iran, and Russia are now, or have previously been in violation of their obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention. The summary also makes several new assessments about compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Certain language describing China’s nuclear weapons testing program requires immediate clarification for the confusion it has generated. Contrary to some news reports published in the hours immediately following the document’s public release, the United States did not conclude that China has conducted covert or yield-producing nuclear tests during 2019, nor did it conclude that China is in non-compliance with any of its commitments regarding nuclear weapons testing. Rather, the Executive Summary cites several additional activities that “raised concerns regarding [China’s] adherence to the ‘zero yield’ standard adhered to by the United States.” Both Russia and China have already denied the charges levelled in the report regarding low-yield testing and made counter-accusations about the U.S. testing program.

In this summary, the United States also certified that Russia is in compliance with its obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START or NST) which is set to expire on February 5, 2021. This agreement may be extended for up to five years upon presidential agreement, but the Trump Administration continues to say it is reviewing a possible extension.

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (CHINA)

China maintained a high level of activity at its Lop Nur nuclear weapons test site throughout 2019. China’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur test site year-round, its use of explosive containment chambers, extensive excavation activities at Lop Nur, and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities – which has included frequently blocking the flow of data from its International Monitoring System (IMS) stations to the International Data Center operated by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization – raise concerns regarding its adherence to the “zero yield” standard adhered to by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)

The United States finds that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that have created nuclear yield and are not consistent with the U.S. “zero-yield” standard. The United States does not know how many, if any, supercritical or self-sustaining nuclear experiments Russia conducted in 2019. Despite Russia renewing its nuclear testing moratorium in 1996, some of its activities since 1996 have demonstrated a failure to adhere to the U.S. “zero-yield” standard, which would prohibit supercritical tests.

Iran

In November 2019, the Acting IAEA Director General (DG) reported the detection by IAEA inspectors of particles of chemically processed uranium at an undeclared location in Iran and noted that this indicates the possibility of undeclared nuclear material in Iran. The IAEA continues to engage Iran regarding an explanation for the presence of these uranium particles that is consistent with the IAEA’s technical analysis. Iran’s intentional failure to declare nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards would constitute a clear violation of Iran’s CSA required by the NPT, and would constitute a violation of Article III of the NPT itself. Until Iran provides a full and complete explanation for the presence of this man-made uranium, the IAEA’s safeguards -7- concerns are a matter of current proliferation concern. (Following the reporting period, additional concerns arose with regard to Iran’s compliance with its safeguards obligations and commitments. In March 2020, the IAEA DG reported that Iran had failed to provide inspector access at two locations not declared by Iran, and did not substantively respond to the IAEA’s requests for clarification regarding possible undeclared nuclear material or activities at those locations and a third, unspecified location.) During the reporting period, Iran progressively expanded its uranium enrichment activities and a stockpile of enriched uranium, key factors in determining the amount of time required to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon or device, should Iran decide to pursue nuclear weapons. If Iran were to manufacture or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon, such actions would violate its obligations under Article II of the NPT.

U.S. COMPLIANCE In 2019

The United States continued to be in compliance with all of its obligations under arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements. When other countries have formally raised a compliance concern regarding U.S. implementation activities, the United States has carefully reviewed the matter to confirm its actions were in compliance with its obligations under the following instruments:

a) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention or BWC);

b) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC);

c) Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty);

d) Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty or TTBT), Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist -4- Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET), and Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty or LTBT);

e) 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;

f) Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE);

g) Treaty on Open Skies (OST);

h) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT);

i) Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START or NST); and

j) Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, as amended (Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement or PMDA)

Nuclear Treaties

With the voluntarily increasing of Nuclear Weapons in the world, the threat and the irreparable damage of its use brought the consideration of world leaders into it. The leaders from the world have come forward to bring various treaties to curb its proliferation and future use. The IAEA promotes adherence to and implementation of International legal instrument on Nuclear Safety adopted under its auspices. This includes the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, as well as the two emergency preparedness and response conventions.

Convention on Nuclear Safety:

• Adopted in Vienna, Austria on June 17 1994, and came into force on October 24, 1996, to commit participating states operating land-based civil nuclear power plants to maintain a high level of safety by setting international benchmarks to which States would subscribe.

• The basis of the convention is the Parties' common interests to achieve higher level of safety to be ensured through regular meetings.

• It obliges parties to submit reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at meetings that are normally held at IAEA Headquarters.

• As of July 2015, there are 78 state parties to the Convention plus the European Atomic Energy Community. The states that have signed the treaty but have not ratified it include Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, Iceland, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Monaco, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Philippines, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

• The Organizational Meeting for the Seventh Review Meeting was held on 15 October 2015.

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste management:

• Adopted in Vienna on 5th September 1997 and came into force on 18th June 2001.

• It is the first legal instrument to address the issue of spent fuel and radioactive waste management safety on a global scale.

• The convention applies to spent fuel resulting from the operation of civilian applications. It also applies to spent fuel and radioactive waste from military or defence programmes if such materials are transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian programmes, or when declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purpose of the Convention by the Contracting Party concerned.

• The states that ratify the Convention agree to be governed by the Convention's provisions on the storage of nuclear waste, including transport and the location, design, and operation of storage facilities.

• The Convention implements meetings of the state parties that review the states' implementation of the Convention.

• Five review meetings were convened since the Joint Convention entered into force. The fifth review meeting of the Joint Convention was held in May 2015.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):

• Adopted on June 12 1968 at UN, New York and came into force on March 5th 1970.

• The NPT aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of disarmament.

• The Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the IAEA, which also plays a central role under the Treaty in areas of technology transfer for peaceful purposes.

• As of August 2016, 191 states have adhered to the treaty, though North Korea, which acceded in 1985 but never came into compliance, announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, following detonation of nuclear devices in violation of core obligations.

• Four UN member states have never accepted the NPT, three of which are thought to possess nuclear weapons: India, Israel, and Pakistan. In addition, South Sudan, founded in 2011, has not joined.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty):

• Opened for signature on August 6th 1985, came into force on Dec 11, 1986, a permanent nature treaty which will remain into force indefinitely.

• It was signed by the South Pacific nations of Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa on the island of Rarotonga (where the capital of the Cook Islands is located).

• It formalises a Nuclear -Weapons Free Zone in the South Pacific. The treaty bans the use of testing and possession of Nuclear Weapons within the borders of the zone.

• There are three protocols to the treaty, which have been signed by the five declared nuclear states, with the exception of Protocol 1 for China and Russia who have no territory in the Zone. – no manufacture, stationing or testing in their territories within the Zone – no use against the Parties to the Treaty, or against territories where Protocol 1 is in force – no testing within the Zone

• In 1996 France and the United Kingdom signed and ratified the three protocols. The United States signed them the same year but has not ratified them. China signed and ratified protocols 2 and 3 in 1987. Russia has also ratified protocols 2 and 3 with reservations.

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok):

• It is a Nuclear Weapons Moratorium Treaty between 10 South-east Asian Member states under the auspices of the ASEAN.

• It was opened for signature at the treaty conference in Bangkok, Thailand, on 15 December 1995 and it entered into force on March 28, 1997 and obliges its members not to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons.

• The Zone is the area comprising the territories of the states and their respective continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ); "Territory" means the land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic waters, the seabed and the sub-soil thereof and the airspace above them.

• The treaty includes a protocol under which the five nuclear-weapon states recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely China, the United States, France, Russia and the United Kingdom (who are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council) undertake to respect the Treaty and do not contribute to a violation of it by State parties. None of the nuclear-weapon states have signed this protocol.

Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT):

• Also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, which prohibits all test detonations of nuclear weapons except for those conducted underground.

• The PTBT was signed by the governments of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States in Moscow on 5 August 1963 before being opened for signature by other countries.

• The treaty formally went into effect on 10 October 1963. Since then, 123 other states have become party to the treaty. Ten states have signed but not ratified the treaty.

• Negotiations initially focused on a comprehensive ban, but this was abandoned due to technical questions surrounding the detection of underground tests and Soviet concerns over the intrusiveness of proposed verification methods.

Conference on Disarmament (CD):

• A forum established by the International Community to negotiate multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements.

• Established in 1979, it was the forum used by its member states, currently numbering 65, to negotiate the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

• It is not formally a United Nations (UN) Organization, but it is linked so because of the personal representation of UN Secretary General. Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly often request the conference to consider specific disarmament matters. In turn, the conference annually reports its activities to the Assembly.

• The Conference succeeded the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962-68) and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-78). • In the 1990s, the Conference held intensive efforts over three years to draft the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which was submitted by Australia to UNGA on Sep 10 1996.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty:

• It is a multilateral treaty that bans all nuclear explosions, in all environments by everyone. It was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996 but has not entered into force as eight specific states have not ratified the treaty at the time of its adoption.

• As of August 2016, it has 183 signatories of which 166 have ratified it.

• Obligations: – Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. – Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT):

• A proposed international treaty to prohibit the further production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Neither this treaty has been negotiated nor have its terms been defined.

• Fissile Material is any material which can be used to create a Nuclear Bomb. It includes high enriched uranium and plutonium (except plutonium that is over 80% Pu-238).

• Plutonium-239 is the isotope most useful for nuclear weapons. Plutonium-239 and 241 are fissile, meaning the nuclei of their atoms can break apart by being bombarded by slow moving thermal neutrons, releasing energy, gamma radiation and more neutrons.

Conclusion: The world has entered a new nuclear age. While the risk of large-scale, world-ending nuclear war has declined, regional instability, the proliferation of weapons and the materials to make them along with emerging threats like cyber and terrorism mean the risk of a single nuclear weapon or device being detonated - by accident, by miscalculation or on purpose - is on the rise. Our current nuclear policies have not adapted to today's security environment. This status quo is not sustainable, and the consequences of inaction are unacceptable. Unless we adapt our policies and forces to deal with new and emerging threats, global security will remain at serious risk.

India’s Entry into NSG

Part of: GS-II- International treaties (PT-MAINS-PERSONALITY TEST)

Recently the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) also known as P5 countries (China, France, Russia, Britain and the US) - have concluded their meetings to discuss issues related to nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

• China has said that India must sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to gain entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
• Earlier, after India applied for the NSG membership, Pakistan too applied for the same following which China, a close ally of Pakistan, called for a two-step approach which states that NSG members first need to arrive at a set of principles for the admission of non-NPT states into the group and then move forward discussions of specific cases.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

• NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seek to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.
• The NSG was set up as a response to India’s nuclear tests conducted in 1974.
• The aim of the NSG is to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
• The grouping has 48 participating governments and the European Commission acts as an Observer.
• Since 2008, India has sought membership in the NSG. The same year, the NSG granted India a "clean waiver" from its existing rules, which forbids nuclear trade with a country which has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
• The waiver paved the way for India to engage in nuclear trade and led to the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal. India has since signed civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with the U.S., U.K., France, Canada, Argentina, Australia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Namibia, and South Korea.
• The drive for India's membership got a decisive boost when the U.S declared support for India joining the quartet of multilateral export control regimes.
• U.S proposed case for a country-specific rather than a criteria-based approach rested on the argument that India's nuclear record and commitment to non-proliferation norms qualified it as a "like-minded country" to join the NSG.

NOTE: The four multilateral export control regimes are Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group (AG) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India is not a member of NSG only.

Impediments to India’s NSG bid

• NSG operates by consensus and all its current members are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
• China has relied on an obstructionist argument claiming that a “compulsory” requirement for NSG membership is that they must be signatories to the NPT.
• China equates India with Pakistan — which has an established history of nuclear proliferation, further complicating the scenario.

Significance of NSG Membership for India

• Membership of NSG will increase India’s access to state-of-the-art nuclear technology from members of the Group.
• As per India’s commitment under the Paris climate agreement, it has to ensure that 40% of its energy is sourced from renewable and clean sources by 2030. In order to achieve this target, India needs to scale up nuclear power production. This can only happen if India gains access to NSG.
• Some nations are restricted by regional treaties (For eg., Pelindaba Treaty) to provide access to nuclear fuel and technology to India. If India joins the NSG, such restrictions are expected to be done away with.

India and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

• The NPT is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of disarmament.
• It represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.
• Nuclear-weapon states parties under the NPT are defined as those that manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967.
• India did not sign it as the treaty was discriminatory. India argued that treaties like NPT were selectively applicable to only non-nuclear powers and legitimized the monopoly of nuclear power by a few.
• Consequently India conducted nuclear explosion test in May 1974, all along maintaining that it was committed to peaceful use of atomic energy.
• In 1998, India again conducted a nuclear explosion tests, and acquired the capacity to use nuclear energy for military purposes.
• To alleviate the fears of a world community, India formulated a comprehensive nuclear doctrine. The major tenets of this doctrine are:
  • Maintenance of a credible minimum nuclear deterrence.
  • Professes no first use policy.
  • Commitment to global veritable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament leading to a nuclear weapons-free world.
• India has abided by both NPT and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) even though it is non-signatory. This along with its commitments to nuclear non-proliferation under the NSG waiver in 2008 provides India with a strong basis for membership in NSG.

CTBT

• The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the treaty banning all nuclear explosions - everywhere, by everyone.
• The Treaty was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. It opened for signature on 24 September 1996.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the USA

Part of: GS-II- Nuclear disarmament (PT-MAINS-PERSONALITY TEST)

U.S. President Donald Trump declared that the U.S. is quitting the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a bilateral agreement with Russia signed in 1987.

The decision was not unexpected since the U.S. has long maintained that Russia has been violating the treaty and Mr Trump has been critical of arms control agreements because, according to him, other countries cheat putting the U.S. at a disadvantage.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty:

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty, formally Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles) is a 1987 arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Under the INF Treaty, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to eliminate within three years all ground-launched-missiles of 500-5,500 km range and not to develop, produce or deploy these in future.

The U.S. destroyed 846 Pershing IIs and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and the U.S.S.R., 1,846 missiles (SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s), along with its support facilities.

Importance of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in U.S.-Russia relations:

Under the Treaty, the two parties agreed that a whole important class of nuclear weapons would be removed from Europe, and only tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) or short-range missiles mostly deployed on the territory of Germany would remain.

The INF Treaty for years served to mitigate fears of both parties in relation to the possibility of military escalation, and operational miscalculation, and helped to shift the logic of MAD [mutually assured destruction] to the higher “more sensitive” political level.

The adverse consequences of the present decision by Mr Trump:

Mr Trump’s decision has generated dismay and concern that this will trigger a new nuclear arms race in Europe and elsewhere.

What it ignores is that the INF Treaty reflected the political reality of the Cold War of a bi-polar world with two nuclear superpowers no longer consistent with today’s multi-polar nuclear world.

The greater challenge today is to understand that existing nuclear arms control instruments can only be preserved if these evolve to take new realities into account.

What is the impact of U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty on China?

Intermediate-range missile systems and cruise missiles would considerably enrich U.S. capabilities in a potential clash over Taiwan or another contentious strategic issue.

As the PLA of China has a variety of cruise missiles that can be launched from land, air, sea, and sub-surface platforms, returning to intermediate-range systems would equip American forces with the capability to strike targets that are highly difficult to penetrate for conventional weapons at present.

Meanwhile, vector enhancement of political relations with states all over the world, particularly those that are economically and politically affiliated to China, with possible shows of economic might and deeper engagement in the field of security.

All this will serve as a catalyst of economic allegiance and a probe of America’s security creed, especially in the region of the Pacific and Asia.

Nevertheless, joining the arms race in Asia may lead China into a trap of “competitive strategy.”

Foreign and Security policy consequences for U.S. nuclear deterrence in the absence of the INF treaty:

Leaving the INF Treaty would allow the U.S. to balance the military technology gap with these assets, which has grown since 1980, especially between U.S. and China.

In harmony with the Limited Test Ban Treaty of the 1960s, SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty] and START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty], the INF has had a codifying effect on the two superpowers’ strategic relations.

Washington’s leaving the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] and INF Treaty creates a formal agreement to vertical proliferation of WMD and gives higher status to the concept of power in international politics.

Conclusion:

In today’s return of major power rivalry, it is no longer a bi-polar world, and nuclear arms control is no longer governed by a single binary equation.

There are multiple nuclear equations — U.S.-Russia, U.S.-China, U.S.-North Korea, India-Pakistan, India-China, but none is standalone.

Therefore, neither nuclear stability nor strategic stability in today’s world can be ensured by the U.S. and Russia alone and this requires us to think afresh.

The most important achievement of nuclear arms control is that the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons has been held since 1945.

Preserving the taboo is critical but this needs the realisation that existing nuclear arms control has to be brought into line with today’s political realities.